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Abstract.
This paper intends to depart from a critique of the nexus of contracts theory of the 
firm  endowed  with  its  moral  personification  to  propose  some  theoretical 
foundations of the firm as a real entity. Some old legal views of the corporation 
are  mobilized  to  complete  the  conceptual  vacuity  of  economic  theories.  This 
provides crucial insights for modern complex organizations such as the network-
firm. The integrating and unifying role of intra-network power relationships is
then emphasized and some law and economics of the network-firm are ultimately 
proposed  to  clarify  the argument  that  the  network-firm  −  as  the  firm  stricto 
sensu − is a singular real entity composed from distinct legal entities.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The theory of the firm field is fundamentally concerned with defining the nature 
of the firm. In essence, the firm is traditionally recognized as a legal person called 
societate that is distinct from the actual persons who compose it. The firm is the
creation of law that provides capacity to enter into legal relations, and the entity 
upon which the law confers such personality is a moral person (Foley, 1929). The 
dominant economic theories of the firm do not lead to something else, denying 
the fundamental differences between contract and organization and reformulating 
the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or as a ‘collection 
of non-human assets’ (Moore, 1992). Hence, the firm is nothing more than a 
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Organizations, Institutions, Systems and Regions Â», Copenhague : Danemark (2008)"relationships among individuals. But is the firm simply a nexus of contracts? If 
not, what really is the nature of the firm? 
According to the nexus of contracts view, the firm does not exist as such. The 
firm is a simple abstraction which would have no existence without a name. But 
the firm is real and is neither a fiction nor an aggregate. The legal theory of the 
firm has become a topic of strong intellectual debate between legal fiction and 
real  entity  approaches  of  the  corporation.  Reducing  the  firm  to a  nexus  of 
contracts is not suitable to disclose its real nature. The main step for theorizing 
the firm is to recognize it as a real entity, i.e., as a cohesive and durable whole of 
integrated human and non-human constituents that is other than a sum of its parts 
and members. The real single entity ‘firm’ is perpetuated by an institutional and 
organizational glue that holds the complex whole together. This glue unifies some 
particular individual entities into a singular collective entity. The first research 
aim of the paper is therefore to propose some theoretical foundations of the firm1
as a real entity.
The central focus of this article is the firm taken in an economic, and so in a 
large, sense. That’s why it is interesting to extend the proposition that the firm is 
a real entity to a modern form of vertical economic organization: the network-
firm. This latter links some legally autonomous firms into a single productive 
system  through  a  hub-firm  that  has  the  de  facto power  to  control  the  whole 
without recourse to equity ownership. The network-firm is not a firm taken in a 
legal sense. The determination of the boundaries of that entity is difficult because
the economic integration of the network-firm transcends the legal boundaries of 
the firm (Rajan and Zingales, 2000). The choice of the relevant unit of analysis is
hence an important issue to raise. Is the network-firm just a set of distinct legal 
entities or a single real entity? 
The  integration  of  the  whole  network  cannot  be  reduced  to  contract  and 
ownership  but  must  be  extended  to  power  arising  wherever  the  economic 
dependence of one party upon the other is effectively significant. Power is not 
exclusively provided by ownership but as well by control and access to critical 
resources.  The  more  critical  resources,  the stronger  the  whole  power.  The 
emergence of such complex organizations implies that it is crucial to develop an 
understanding of network logic that relies on multiple constructs which would 
come from different origins as economics, legal theory and other social sectors 
involved (Teubner, 2002). Beyond the range of employment protection laws and 
beyond politico-legal liability, the theorization of the network-firm as a single 
real entity highlights some issues in law. This shows that the legal entity status 
provided by the law is very important and cannot be neglected (Hodgson, 2002)
but  is  clearly  not  sufficient to  apprehend  the  nature  of  the  firm. The  second 
                                             
1 A theory of the firm has to address the issues of the nature, the boundaries and the internal 








































9research aim of the paper is then to reveal that the definition of the firm as a real 
entity allows us to shed light on the nature of modern economic organizations.
The rest of the article is organized in five sections. Section 2 explains the 
theoretical way which leads from a theory of the firm as a legal fiction to a theory 
of the firm as a real entity. Section 3 proposes an economic characterization of 
the network-firm as a complex relational entity. Section 4 argues that this form of 
productive  organization  is  more  than  a  matter  of  contracts  because  of  the 
importance of intra-network power relationships. Section 5 clarifies the fact that 
even though corporate law distinguishes several entities two or more separate 
legal  entities  forming  a  network-firm act  as  a  single  real  entity.  Section  6
concludes.
2. ON THE SEMINAL QUESTION OF THE NATURE OF THE FIRM
In this section, the question of the nature of the firm is approached from the point 
of view of dominant economic theories. Accordingly, this section sheds light on 
the reductionist position of theories advocating the personification of the firm by 
the metaphor of law. The firm is neither a legal fiction nor an aggregate but a real 
entity. Some theoretical bases are proposed for an ontological recognition of the 
firm as a real entity. 
2.1. The firm as a legal fiction
According  to  mainstream  theories,  the  nature  of  the  firm  is  based  on  the 
organization of a bundle of some different contractual arrangements. The firm is 
a nexus of contracts. Contract is the central modular mechanism able to play both 
a coordinating and incentive provision role within and between firms. Such a 
contractual analysis implies some sense of continuity between the firm and the 
market.  Contractual  relations  are  the  essence  of  firms  and  human  beings  are 
parties to this nexus of contracts. Individuals exist only as regards with contracts. 
There  are  no  strict  ontological  differences  between  contract  and  organization
since organizations should be seen as contractual arrangements through which 
transactions pass smoothly. The firm differs from market not in nature but in 
degree because the contract is the basis of all governance structures. Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972:785) consider that the classical firm is a ‘particular contractual 
structure’2 that possesses the properties of an efficient market, i.e, a team whose 
value exceeds the sum of the market values each could get separately and where 
contracts aim to restrain and control the actions of individuals. 
                                             
2 Alchian and Demsetz (1972:794) argue that ‘the terms of the contracts form the basis of the 
entity called the firm’. They add that technological inseparability needs joint production, which 








































9The modern theory of property rights, which defines the firm as a collection of 
non-human assets, revolves about this theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts 
insisting that firms arise where market contractual relationships fail. According to 
the nexus of contracts view, it is not useful to determine what a firm is and what 
it is not (Cheung, 1983). On the contrary, the collection of assets view of the firm 
states that  the  understandings of  the  nature  and  boundaries  of  the  firm  are 
intimately correlated and matter3. The modern property rights theory has tried to 
explain firm boundaries in terms of the optimal allocation of assets ownership. 
The assets which are held by the firm form this one and not the others. The holder 
of residual rights of control4 over non-human assets in a coalition has power over 
human capital owners who need non-human assets in order to be productive, so 
that ‘control over a physical asset in this line can lead indirectly to control over 
human assets’ (Hart and Moore, 1990:1121). In a world of incomplete contracts 
subject to renegotiation later on, the firm as an institution takes on importance 
and  the  extension  of  the  size  of  the  firm  is  a  solution  to  allocate  efficiently 
residual rights of control (Grossman and Hart, 1986). The firm becomes a single 
‘owner’ that has residual rights of control on these assets. As for the non-human 
assets, they constitute the glue that keeps the firm together. Without this glue, the 
firm is  ‘just  a phantom’ (Hart,  1995:57). Ultimately,  even  in  transaction cost 
economics, where the firm is a governance structure coordinated by a hierarchical 
authority coming from a ‘private ordering’ (Williamson, 2002), the basic unit of 
analysis is transaction, i.e., the type of contracts. 
Arguably, these economic theories have in common to tie the nature of the 
firm to a contractual essence. The firm is just ‘an aggregate formed by private 
contracting  among  its  human  parts’ (Phillips,  1994:1065). The  legal 
personification of the firm promotes its representation. But from when is a nexus 
of contracts a firm (Demsetz, 1988)? The answer is never both because otherwise 
the firm would be just a sum of contracts and individuals who own resources and 
nothing  more  and  because  ‘the  reasoning  cannot  escape  circularity  since  one 
cannot  identify  a  nexus  of  contracts  independently  of  a  given  firm’ (Gindis, 
2007:270). 
The nexus of explicit contracts view, which is as influent in economic theory 
as in corporate law theory, proposes an incomplete theoretical treatment of the 
nature of the firm. In this view, ‘we do not exactly know what a firm is’ because 
the  firm  is  ‘a  shorthand  description  of  a  way  to  organize  activities under 
contractual arrangements’ (Cheung, 1983:3). The nexus of contracts theory does 
not recognize the firm distinctly from its parts but determines its nature as regards 
                                             
3 Even if it is obviously impossible ‘to draw a hard and fast line which determines whether there 
is a firm or not’ (Coase, 1937:392).
4 The residual right of control of an asset is ‘the right to control all aspects of the asset that have 








































9with the relations between its aggregated parts. Bratton (1989:1498) concludes 
that ‘some transactions involve the fictive firm entity as a party, but only as a 
matter of convenience’. The firm is a legal person that is nothing more than an 
artificial entity that exists only by the way of metaphor (fiction) of law. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976:312) insist on the fact that ‘most organizations are simply 
legal  fictions  which  serve  as  a  nexus  of  contracting  relationships  among 
individuals’. 
By a legal fiction it is meant that an economic organization must be treated as 
a single individual. Since the firm is a nexus of contracts, those contracts must 
have  parties.  But  a  single  individual  aggregates  these  parties.  The  firm  is  a 
person, i.e., a ‘right-and-duty-bearing unit’. To confer legal rights or to impose 
legal  duties  is  to  confer  legal  personality and  ‘the  rights  and  duties  of  the 
fictitious  person  correspond closely  to  those  of  an  actual  person’ (Williston, 
1888:107). The corporation can own assets, negotiate and sign contracts and sue 
or be sued. But if corporate personality is a fiction, it is fallacious to argue that 
the entity, which is personified, is fictitious (Machen, 1911). From then on, an 
epistemological question arises: are firms ‘natural outcomes of human social life 
or derivative and sterile creations of positive laws’ (Mark, 1987:1468)?
Treating the firm as a fiction is similar to say that the firm does not exist. 
Since  the  firm  does  not  exist  then  it  could  not  have responsibilities.  Yet  the 
corporation has rights and liabilities in tort. Furthermore, the firm as an institution 
has responsibilities which go beyond the residual claims of owners of capital 
(Collins,  1993).  But  the  firm  does  not  have  human  wants,  motivations  or
intentions. The firm does not really behave but individuals do. For all that, the 
firm is not a mere sum of individuals having duties and rights defined by legal 
relationships of contract and property. If a corporation is the sum of its human 
components, ‘how can it decide to act unless every member agrees to the action 
in question’ (Phillips, 1994:1083)?
The law cannot explain how individuals bind themselves in a firm. Firms are 
singular entities that develop collectively a ‘cognitive capacity’ and an ability to 
‘act’ in  certain  ways.  However, all  reference  to  psychic  organisms  is  ‘either 
gratuitous or highly misleading’ (Dewey, 1926:673). Cohen (1935:811) reminds
that  ‘nobody  has  ever  seen  a  corporation’ and  warns against  ‘transcendental 
nonsense’. The corporate person is a representation of social realities which the 
law recognizes but does not create. In other words, ‘the necessity for persons to 
compose the corporation results from the nature of things rather than from any 
rule of law’ (Williston, 1888:114). The firm is neither a fictitious entity nor a 
living  organism,  contrary  to  the natural  entity  view  of Maitland (1905). 
McKelvey (1997:352) extends this argument by defining firms as quasi-natural 
entities that ‘result from both individual human intentionality and natural causes 








































9social identity of their own that differs from the identities of individuals who 
create them. 
According to  aggregate  theories,  shareholders  circumscribe  the  legal  entity 
called ‘firm’. Shareholders are the aggregate’s key figures. They constitute only 
one person in law so that they are the firm (Ireland, 1999)5. But shareholders do 
not own the firm as such. No one owns the firm and the ‘corporation’s being 
person  implies  that  it  cannot  be  considered  as  an  object  of  property  rights’
(Gindis, 2007:272). In other words, ‘corporate assets belong not to shareholders 
but to the corporation itself’ (Blair and Stout, 1999:250-251). This gives food for 
thought that the firm is not a nexus of owners. Consequently, the firm cannot be 
treated as a set of individuals aggregated into a homogenous group of interests 
called ‘the owner’. The firm must be recognized as ‘an end in itself’, which needs 
a  model  of  corporate  behaviour  which  gives  it existence  independent  from 
shareholders (Kay and Silberston, 1995). 
In a firm, some different individualities act in a unified way. So the firm is ‘an 
organised body of men acting as a unit, and with a will that has become unified 
though the singleness of their purpose’ (Laski, 1916:424). Brown (1905) writes
precisely that whenever men act in common they inevitably tend to develop a 
spirit  which  is  something  different  from  themselves  taken  singly  or  in  sum. 
Individuals bind themselves to act for some common purpose. They form a real
entity  which,  by  no  fiction  of law,  differs  from  individuals  of  whom  it  is 
constituted (Dicey, 1904). 
2.2. The firm as a real entity
The reductionist theoretical treatment of the firm as a nexus of contracts falls 
under  a  ubiquitous  methodological  individualism.  But,  if  it seems  wrong to 
reduce  the  dynamics  of  social  processes  to  individual’s  actions, it  is  equally 
wrong to see collectivities such as the legal person as mere shorthand expressions 
for the complex aggregates of individual actions (Teubner, 1988). While the firm 
exists independently of its individual members, it does not ‘act’ in a way that is 
apart from them. The parts are as real as the whole. Inside the firm, ‘neither the 
individuals  nor  the  relation  they  bear  to  one  another  is  fictitious’ (Raymond, 
1906:362). The real entity paradigm portrays corporations as distinct from their 
individual members, though, like them, they had real existence (Tsuk, 2003).
The split between the real entity and the fictitious entity goes hand in hand 
with  the  long  running  debate  between  so-called  holists  and  methodological 
individualists. Nevertheless, there is no need here to discuss these methodological 
                                             
5 He explains that ‘by facilitating recognition of the corporation not as an owner, nor as an object 
capable of being owned, but as a network of social and productive relationships, it would enable 








































9concerns.  Although  the  analysis  of  the  firm  implies  shedding  light  on  some 
holistic dimensions, any form of determinism must be excluded. To include why 
the firm is real, the postulate of emergence needs to be used. This one implies 
that properties of the whole cannot be reduced to properties of its constituents. 
Humphreys  (1997:342)  interestingly  explains  that  emergent  properties  are 
‘qualitatively different from the properties from which they emerge’ because they 
are properties of ‘the entire system rather than local properties of its constituents’.
The firm as a whole interacting system exhibits emergent properties that are both 
novel and largely unexpected (Holland, 1998). The firm is a real emergent entity.
Analyzing theoretically the firm as a real entity implies departing from the 
nexus  of  contracts  theory  which cannot  explain  that  firms  have  social 
responsibilities to non-shareholders as employees or suppliers. Defining the firm 
from the real entity view comes to assert that the firm is something different than 
the sum of its parts. The firm is a social reality with an existence independent of, 
and constituting something more than, its changing parts (Blumberg, 1990). As 
the  firm  is  an  organization  devoted  to  production, the  firm  can  no  longer be 
fictitious. Indeed, what does it mean for a mere nexus to be competitive? Each 
firm is an autonomous entity that competes with other singular entities. Firms are 
not all the same ones. Heterogeneity is an existential property of firms. 
The  term of  ‘real  entity’, exempt  of  all  forms  of  living  mankind, is  very 
suitable to define firm’s nature. Treating the firm as a real entity implies that the 
firm exists intrinsically and objectively. The firm is a complex system6 of human 
members and non-human parts which are interrelated and held together by some
unexpected integrating forces. These forces which result from the exhibition of 
collective properties  and emergent features can  be seen as a ‘glue’. The glue 
expresses the  idea  of  a  durable  vector  of  cohesion  that  unifies  some  distinct 
individual entities into a single real entity. The glue drives the actions of the 
group and explains that the members of the firm think ‘we’ to call themselves and 
think ‘they’ to  designate  a  competing  firm  (Simon,  2002).  That’s  why the 
etymology of firm is usually treated as singular and is incompatible with plural 
verbs and pronouns. The firm exhibits a collective social identity7 that ensures the 
durability and the stability of the complex whole. The firm forms a unit that has 
acquired cohesiveness through time. The actions of the whole are not reducible to 
the actions of its individualities. It is not because a human constituent leaves the 
firm that this one is subject to dissolution. 
                                             
6 Simon (1962:468) defines a complex system as ‘one made up of a large number of parts that 
interact in a nonsimple way’. He adds that ‘in such systems, the whole is more than the sum of 
the parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given 
the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the 
properties of the whole’ (ibid.).   








































9A particular attention must be devoted to this glue which can be restricted to 
its  institutional  and  organizational  dimensions.  The  firm  is  incontestably  held 
together in accordance with a variety of types of glue. By reducing this complex 
concept of glue to its two dimensions, the aim is to underline that the firm is both 
an organization and an institution (Hodgson, 2006). On the one hand, the firm is a 
real  institution  insofar  as  it  regulates  durably  individuals’  behaviour,  ensures 
behavioural ‘conformity’ of the individuals composing the unit and prevents and 
dissipates conflicts. On the other hand, the firm is a real organization insofar as it 
manages through time a bundle of tangible and intangible, human and non-human 
productive  resources  that  change  and  evolve.  The glue  is  the  reflection of  a
synergic  interdependence  that  takes  root  in  a  network  of specific  human 
investments. But there is not a sharp line between institutional and organizational 
glues so that both together form a single productive glue that stabilizes intra and 
interorganizational relationships. The existential glue of the firm generates the 
integrity and the durability of the whole. Each firm conceals its intrinsic glue. 
Knowledge is a strong glue inside the firm. The firm as a productive entity 
generates  specific  knowledge  (Nonaka  et  al.,  2000).  Thus,  ‘the  key  assets  a 
corporation uses in production is intellectual capital − that is, the knowledge and 
experience residing in the minds of its employees, rather than the hands of its 
shareholders’ (Blair and Stout, 1999:261). Without individuals, there is no firm. 
Individuals are the key constituents of the firm8. The firm cannot ‘act’ without 
individuals. The identification of individuals to their firm is a necessary condition 
of cohesiveness  and durability.  The  firm  as a  ‘distributed  knowledge system’ 
develops a ‘collective mind that is an emergent joint accomplishment rather than 
an already defined representation of any one individual’ (Tsoukas, 1996:15). Dosi 
(1995)  explains  thus  that  the  firm  must  be  appreciated  under  different  parts 
among  which  the  incentive  structure,  the  structure  of  information  flows,  the
distribution of knowledge and competences but equally the distribution both of 
formal authority and of power. The exploitation of de jure (formal) and de facto
(informal) powers is indeed the best materialization of the existential glue of the 
firm (see section 4). The firm is a real socio-political entity held in a web of 
powers and counter-powers.  
Finally,  contractual  theories  need  to be  completed  with  competence  and 
resource-based views of the firm (see Gibbons, 2005) − which is more and more 
admitted including among their main supporters (Williamson, 1999; Jacobides 
and Winter, 2005) − to analyse what a firm is. Resources are tied to the firm with 
                                             
8 Defining the firm as a real entity implies to ‘capture human beings in their full variety and 
complexity’ (Phillips, 1994:1111). Since human beings are shaped by their social relations, it is
possible to ‘circumscribe’ individuals that compose the real entity ‘firm’. Individuals that are 








































9a precision that the nexus metaphor lacks. Coff (1999:121) explains that ‘since 
strategic resources are node in the nexus that the firm cannot own, the property 
rights are ambiguous’. But how can economists bypass the mere descriptive use 
of  the  firm  as  ‘a  collective  noun  denoting  a  particular  cluster  of  otherwise 
ordinary contractual relationships’ (Masten, 1988:181)? How can the definition 
of the firm as a real entity be put in empirical  evidence?  We think that it is 
essential to approach these issues by taking into account the emergence of what 
has been called the network-firm. This complex economic organization is based 
on some types of control that exist independently both of the subscription of a 
contract and of vertical ownership integration. Interestingly, the main concern 
becomes about the real entity that has to be used as the relevant unit of analysis. 
3. A VERTICAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHOUT EQUITY OWNERSHIP
In  a  world  of  vertically  integrated  firms  with  recourse  to  equity  ownership,
property rights economists used their theory of the optimal assignment of assets 
to  analyze  the  boundaries  of  the  firm  that  were  relatively  stable  and  easily 
defined.  But,  owing  to  the  movement  towards  vertical  disintegration  and  the 
development  of  complex  productive  systems −  roughly  materialized  by  the 
modular  architecture  (see  e.g.  Langlois,  2002) −, definitions  of  the  firm  and 
analyses  of  its  boundaries  based  exclusively  on  asset  property  rights  can  no 
longer be the only relevant ones (Holmström and Roberts, 1998). Vertical inter-
firm cooperation processes have profoundly affected the relationships between 
legally independent economic entities and the network-firm is the best evidence
of this tendency. 
The network-firm refers  to  a productive entity that unifies a set of legally 
independent firms vertically integrated and coordinated by a main firm called the 
‘hub-firm’  ‘which  is  the  firm  that,  in  fact,  sets  up  the  network  and  takes  a 
proactive attitude in the care of it’ (Jarillo, 1988:32). Firms form a network to 
access complementary and inimitable resources as well as to create an inimitable 
resource by itself only through its formation. From the resource-based view of the 
firm, the creation of critical value-generating resources is linked to the firm’s 
network of relationships (Barney, 1991). The ability to incorporate knowledge
emanating both from  inside  and  outside  the  firm’s  boundaries  ‘emerges  as  a 
distinctive organizational capability’ (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999:317). The 
network-firm can hence be treated as a dynamic network of capabilities. A single 
firm within  the  network is  required  to  manage diverse  and  complementary 
capabilities. Such an assignment must belong to the hub-firm that controls critical 
resources as brand name and reputation around which revolve complementary 
activities  that  need  to  be  qualitatively  and  quantitatively  coordinated.  Critical 
resources  represent  the  core  of  the  network  and  the  hub-firm  carries  out  the 








































9Firms can have recourse to contractual agreements that differ from hierarchy 
even though assets are strongly specific (Holmström and Roberts, 1998). Despite 
lock-in  effects  due  to  the  multilateral  dependence,  transaction  costs  are  not 
necessarily high (Dyer 1997). The network-firm is thus built from some specific
assets − which can be human, physical, immaterial, temporal, dedicated or sited 
(Williamson, 1991) − through recurrent relations stamped of uncertainty. In other 
words, the network-firm  seems to  be based  on  the three  same Williamsonian 
conditions that empirically explain de jure vertical integration. These dedicated 
assets to the hub-firm − which imply specific investments materialized by some 
high  sunk  costs  −  are  supposed  to be the  heart  of  two  linked  problems:
opportunism and hold-up risks. But interorganizational networks often succeed in 
maintaining strong market incentives to invest with a low opportunism (see e.g. 
Zaheer and  Venkatraman,  1995).  Similarly,  property  rights  views  of  the  firm 
cannot better explain vertical disintegration since the network-firm functions as a 
cohesive and sustained whole without recourse to property rights concentration.
Network  exchange  relationships  take  the  form  of  non-market  relational 
exchanges (Dore, 1983). The network-firm differs by nature from market. An 
analysis of the diversity of intra-network incentive and coordination mechanisms 
is needed to reveal the different elements of the glue that holds the network-firm 
cohesive. Inter-firm contracts as an institutionalized base are important but trust, 
which  is  not  contractual  in  essence, is a  necessary  condition  to  network 
maintenance.  Network  embeddedness promotes  incentives  for  long-term 
cooperation and palliates the absence of formalized control systems (Macaulay, 
1963). Networks are more based on mutual interests and on reputation as well as 
less coordinated by a formal authority. Incentive provisions inside the network-
firm are not exclusively contractual but based on some forms of relational and 
reputational commitments that bind the legal entities together to ‘act’ as a unified 
actor. The aim of network-organizations is thus to generate a ‘relational quasi-
rent’ (Dyer and Singh, 1998:662). Poppo and Zenger (2002:707) conclude that 
‘formal contracts and relational governance function as complements’. 
The network-firm binds a set of independent firms vertically related under the 
relational power of a hub-firm that takes care of the integrity of the whole. The 
network-firm is a relational firm (see baker et al., 2002). Orts (1998) argues that 
relational  firms  −  defined as  non  traditional  firms  made  between  or  among 
simpler  firms  to  act  in  unison  to  compete  with  others  in  organizational 
metamarkets  −  draw  attention  to the  analytical  difficulty  in  defining  the 
boundaries of the firm. Indeed, even if economic relations take place between 
legally autonomous firms, the firms of the network form together and draw the 
economic boundaries of a single relational entity that acts, as a dynamic whole of 
interacting  firms,  under  the  legitimate  power of  the  hub-firm. This  relational 








































9Gulati  and  Gargiulo  (1999:1446),  the  ‘relational  embeddedness’  of  the  whole 
network  ‘highlights  the  effects  of  cohesive  ties  between  social  actors  on 
subsequent cooperation between those actors’. The relational management of the 
network-firm strengthens the cohesion of the whole by maintaining the external 
and internal orders that are respectively related to the preservation of reputation 
and the durability of collective social identity.     
Network governance ties autonomous firms that operate like a single entity in 
tasks requiring joint action. Firms establish these privileged relationships through 
strong interactions with each other because there is − across the legal boundaries 
of the firm − a de facto vertical integration (unspecified contracts, long term view 
and tasks structured  by  power). The  boundaries  of the  firm become  muddled 
because they are more and more formed not only by ownership and contract, but 
also by power.
4. POWER AS A FACTOR OF COHESION AND DURABILITY 
According to modern property rights theory, formal power matters inside the firm 
in  events  not  covered  by  the  contract.  However,  power  is  not  antonymic  to 
efficiency − because power does not occur only owing to some market failures − 
but has some effects on the organization’s productive value (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998; Palermo, 2000). Since no association of individuals is wholly formal, there 
is  no  order  and  no  firm  without  power. Even  though  member  firms of  the 
network-organization are not integrated into the same lawful structure, the legal 
contractual  autonomy  does  not  imply  that  the  different  parties  have  equal 
economic  power  and  that  they  can  act  freely  without  restraint (Sacchetti  and 
Sugden,  2003).  How  does  the  economic  entity  ‘network-firm’ structure  the 
various  powers  involved  and  allocate  these?  Answering  to  this  fundamental 
question  implies  proposing  a  usual  definition  of  power, which  is easy  to 
recognize but tricky to define (Pfeffer, 1981). We propose to define power as an 
individual  or  collective  entity’s  ability  to  structure  and  restrain  choices  and 
actions of another entity by some particular mechanisms that are formal as well 
as informal. Power is the central concept in network analysis and the more typical 
phenomenon is interdependence (Thorelli, 1986). 
According to Galbraith (1979), it is inaccurate to isolate economics from the 
real world by eluding power and by refusing to consider it as a political science.
This argument is valid both within and between firms. Benson (1975:229-230) 
characterizes the ‘interorganizational network’ as a ‘political economy’. In this 
sense, he argues that power derives from the central organization’s control over 
strategic  contingencies  confronted  by  the  peripheral  organizations.  But,
reciprocally, the more contingencies are controlled by a peripheral organization, 
the greater its power within the network. If power is a constituent property of 








































9economic  relationships.  Power  is  not  ‘an  attribute of  the  actor’ (Emerson, 
1962:32). Power is, in essence, both a relational and a reputational phenomenon. 
Even if there are power relationships between legally autonomous firms in the 
network-firm, this one forms a durable unit. The political order that is entrenched 
by  the  distribution  of  powers  in  the  whole  social  system  is  a  source  of 
cooperation. 
By treating firms as legal entities, mainstream economists cannot explain the 
mechanisms by which people bind themselves into firms. Power is one of the 
more  important  mechanisms.  But  power  does  not  result  exclusively from 
ownership that, according to the modern theory of property rights, would confer
the  power  to  exercise  control (Grossman  and  Hart,  1986). The  network-firm 
cannot  be  defined  according  to  the  ownership  of  non-human  assets.  The 
definition needs to be extended to power that accrues to key social actors having 
made specific investments around a critical resource of the economic entity and 
‘who cannot be readily replaced in that function’ (Pfeffer, 1981:113). Owing to 
the creation of dependence positions between the members of a network, power is 
more  widely  dispersed  among  them  (Kochan  and  Rubinstein,  2000).  Jacobs
(1974) argues that the essentiality of resources is the main determinant of power-
dependence  relations  between  organizations.  If  power  is  strongly  linked  to 
control on key resources, there is not an exclusive power but there are several
powers  into  the  network-firm, whereas  in  the  traditional  capitalist  firm,
management power was unilateral. The distribution of power into the network-
firm is realized on the basis of the pattern of interdependencies amongst actors’ 
resources and activities. 
The key resources of the network-firm, which are more and more intangible 
and reputational, are embodied in the human and organizational capital whose 
rights of control are not directly contractible and difficult to enforce (Asher et al., 
2005). Contracts and power act as complements in the coordination of network 
activities. According to Krackhardt (1990:357), ‘the knowledge of the network is 
in its own right a base of power above and beyond the power accrued through 
other formal and informal bases’. Intra-network power relationships – which are 
the  result  of  the  entanglement of  dynamic  network  resources – are  the 
materialization  of  the interorganizational  glue  that  keeps  the  network-firm 
together. Emerson (1962) refers to mutual resource dependence as a cohesive 
effect of the power relation. The cohesive ties between the actors of the network 
enhance their learning from others’ knowledge and permit the emergence of a
collective social identity.
The  complementarity  of  critical  resources  generates  a  global  economic 
interdependence. This latter can be utilized as the observe of power. The different 
members of the network – notably the partners that belong to the inner circle –








































9knowledge-creating  process and  get,  like  this,  a  part  of  the  whole  power.
Network-firm-specific human investments are embodied in a valuable collective 
learning process that exists  only given access to critical resources (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998). The consequent problems of coordination may indeed be related 
to access to and to control of network resources. The power of the hub-firm on its 
subcontractors is hence legitimated by its key strategic role in the coordination of 
the whole network. The degree of coordination of the network is strong because 
of the large number of relational contracts9. This  ‘coordinator role’ confers a 
durable specific resource and so a power source to the hub-firm. According to 
Lorenzoni  and  Lipparini  (1999:334),  ‘the  dissemination  of  knowledge  among 
actors improves the absorptive abilities of the whole network as well as mutual 
adaptation  of  network  participants’.  Access  enables  the  network-firm  on  the 
whole to develop its key resources. The control of access to critical resources 
gives to the hub-firm the legitimate ability to draw the organizational design of 
the network and so the configuration of powers. The distribution of power due to 
resource dependence is a necessary condition for the emergence of the network-
firm.
Access is a critical resource in itself that results from strong complementarities 
and dependences that are said to exist when the unit and the firm can together 
create  more value  than  they  can  do  in  their  own  separate  ways (Rajan  and 
Zingales,  1998).  Since  access  is  not  strictly contractual10,  the  analysis  of  the 
network-firm is accurate to reject the broad use of the term contract in economic 
theories of the firm and to expand consideration of the true legal basis for the 
firm. Legally  autonomous  entities  are  integrated  and  coordinated  by  the 
controlling and ordering power of the hub-firm that does not originate in contract 
but in organization itself. The evolution of power exploitation is characterized by 
the non-exclusivity of de jure sources of power. The growth and the distribution 
of de facto powers into network-organizations have some large implications on 
the  definition  and  boundaries  of  the  firm (Rajan  and  Zingales,  2000).  The 
network-firm differs thus from the firm in a usual sense because its boundaries 
differ from the perimeter of the legal entity as a nexus of contracts. Such complex 
organizations have some fundamental implications both in economics and in law, 
notably in terms of employment contract and legal liability. 
5. From multiplicity to unity: some law and economics of the network-firm 
In this section, the raised question is about the necessity for a firm to be a legal 
entity to exist. The theorization of the network-firm as a real entity has strong 
                                             
9 Baker et al. (2002:39) define relational contracts as ‘informal agreements sustained by the value 
of future relationships’. 








































9implications in the field of law and economics of firms. The specialized members 
of the network-firm constitute the critical human resources that give to the whole 
growth  opportunities.  But  there  are  not  employment  contract  and  protection 
between legally independent firms and the hub-firm. Besides, there is not a de 
jure recognition of the network-firm in terms of legal liability.   
5.1. Beyond the scope of employment protection rights
Taking  into  account  that  a  firm  is  a  fairly  well-defined  contractual  structure 
whose interests are simply an extension of the interests of its owners comes back 
to think that employees are contracting with the firm but are not themselves a part 
of it (Blair, 1999). Alchian and Demsetz (1972:111) argue that the firm ‘has no 
power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest 
degree from ordinary market contracting between any two people’. Authority is 
just an  illusion.  Property  rights  theorists  have  studied  the  nature  of  the  firm 
separately  from  the  structure  and  terms  of  relationships  with  and  among  its 
employees. But each employment relationship is intrinsic to a firm and makes it 
different by nature from the market. Tsuk (2003:1862) reminds that ‘there is no 
one group of people more identified with a corporation and more responsible for 
its day-to-day conduct than corporate workers’. Employment contract constitutes 
a  strong  formal  institutional  glue  that  lacks  in  the  network-firm  where  some 
critical  resources  may  extend  beyond  firm’s  legal  boundaries. The  economic 
perimeter of the network-firm is circumscribed by the perimeter of the hub-firm’s 
reputational power. In other words, the exploitation of power draw a perimeter 
which can be treated as the one of the very network-firm. More generally, the 
recent trend towards outsourcing of productive modules places the employment 
relationship beyond the range of employment protection laws (Collins, 1990b). 
The relations of power within these inter-firm relations cannot be said to be 
totally free of legal principles. But the employment relationship assumes a legal 
particularity  that  differs  from  a  trading  relation  between  firms  even  though 
contractual  clauses  are  susceptible  to  control  the  actions  of  partners.  If  both 
transactors have right to sue, the real authority11 of the hub-firm has not the same 
base  compared  with obligations,  sanctions  or  procedures  (Masten,  1988).  For 
example,  in  automobile  industry,  the  majority  of  the  production  workers are 
employees,  not  of  the  hub-firm  (auto  constructor),  but  of  subcontractors  that 
provide components and modules along the vertical  line of production. Yet a
focal firm cannot legally aspire to a formal authority on the employees of its 
subcontractors. For all that, access is a de facto dynamic mechanism that palliates 
the  absence  of  employment  contracts and  provides better  incentives  than 
ownership; the latter one having adverse effects on the incentive to specialize
                                             








































9(Rajan and Zingales, 1998). The network-firm has a power distribution with its 
sources in the interorganizational division of labor. The degree of closeness of 
human resources towards strategic assets is the main factor in power sharing. 
Access  to  critical  resources  makes that  the  subunits  of  a  network-firm  are 
mutually related in the interdependent activities of a single social system. 
Since any employment contract ties the hub-firm to suppliers’ employees, the 
power of the hub-firm is not de jure but de facto. The analysis of the network-
firm shows a strong separation between the de jure employer (peripheral firm) 
and the de facto employer (hub-firm) that makes the employment relationship
ambiguous.  The  employment  contract  is  a  single  employer-employee 
relationship.  But  the  development  of  complex  economic  organizations,  where 
there are multiple employers, has strong implications for both the legal and the 
socially constituted nature of the employment relationship (Rubery et al., 2002).
Ratner (2001) explains that corporations have always wielded significant power, 
conferred by law, over their employees. It is no longer true with the emergence of 
such complex vertical organizations. Power does not result exclusively from the 
law.  Collins  (1990b:355)  argues  that  ‘this  raises  the  question  whether  the 
exclusion from employment protection rights is in fact an important reason for 
vertical disintegration rather than an unfortunate side-effect of other economic 
forces’.  If  it  seems  pertinent  to  enrich  labour  law  to  take  into  account  the 
relationships of subordination between the hub-firm and its partners and to give 
rights to employees of subcontractors (Morin, 2005), it seems equally necessary 
to recognize the network-firm as a single real entity for some particular legal 
questions. The legal basis is fundamental to theorize the firm. But it does not 
mean that the network-firm cannot be considered as a real entity because the law 
does not recognize it.
5.2. Beyond the scope of politico-legal liability
Some  powerful  tansnational firms, from  automotive  industry  to  textile  and 
microcomputer industry, have chosen during the 1980’s and 1990’s to base their 
activity on outsourcing. Within these constituted productive entities, a hub-firm 
obtains a huge power to state how relationships with its subcontractors have to be 
organized. The hub-firm is the ‘reputational leader’ that coordinates the network, 
generates the glue, prevents it from dissolution and creates value greater than the 
sum of its parts by integrating the contributed modules into a single active unit12. 
                                             
12 The  term  ‘network-firm’ focuses  on  the  singularity  of  this  organization  that  implements  a 
single productive process. It is more delicate to qualify a network of firms as a network-firm as 
soon as some of legally independent firms belong to several entities. In other words, to the level 








































9The  properties  of  the  collective  entity  differ  from  those  of  the  interacting 
individual  entities  and  cannot  be  reduced  to  them.  In  the  spirit  of  Cohen 
(1919:680), the interorganizational glue of the network-firm is this ‘something
uniting the different individuals (distinct legal entities) so that they act differently 
than they would  if there  were not  so  interdependent’.  Van de Ven  (1976:28)
grasps the network-firm as ‘a social action system that exhibits the basic common 
properties of any form of organized collective behaviour: behaviour is aimed at a 
goal, interdependence exists between members, and it can act as a unit with an 
identity separate from its  members’. Is the network-firm a firm as such? The 
answer is ‘yes’ in an economic sense but ‘no’ in a legal sense. 
The network-firm is not a legal entity with some rights because it is not a 
moral person. If the network-firm is not a fiction of law, it is not more a ‘mind-
body unity of real associative personality nor autonomized bundles of resources’
(Teubner, 1993:56). The network-firm is a collective unit ‘when the relations are 
so long term and recurrent that it is difficult to speak of the parties as separate 
entities’ and when the ‘entangling of obligations and reputation reaches a point 
that  the  actions  of  the  parties  are  interdependent,  but  there  is  no  common 
ownership  or  legal  framework’ (Powell,  1990:301).  The  network-firm  is  a 
singular real entity regardless of legal structure, as real as any legally recognized 
firm. There are not de jure sources of liability without equity ownership. Yet the 
hub-firm’s shareholders do not hold shares in the network but only in the hub-
firm which does not hold property rights to member firms. The legal definition of 
the firm matters because the law recognizes firms that constitute the network. But 
the law needs to be reconsidered as regards with modern organizations that have 
become  a  complex  and  multilevel  phenomenon for  lawyers  and  economists. 
Collins  (1990a)  then Hansmann  and kraakman  (1991)  have  explained that 
disaggregated organizations raise  the  problem  of  the  capital  boundaries  since 
networks benefit from the power to manipulate capital boundaries in order to 
reduce or eliminate potential legal liabilities. 
The network-firm ‘acts’ collectively and not through a single action centre. 
Such a complex organization must be treated as a single real entity in terms of 
liabilities against outsiders. In the case of outside disturbances, the question is 
whether the network-firm should react as a whole or whether the parts should 
react autonomously. Since the network-firm is an integrated functional economic 
unit, it must also be liability unit in situations where causation damage can be 
traced back only to the network itself (Teubner, 1993). The network-firm should 
be considered in some cases as ‘a united group for the purpose of the ascription 
of legal personality’ (Collins,  1990a:744). In this  view, Ballantine (1943:426) 
suggests  to  disregard  the  corporate  entity  as  a  regulatory  process  in  order  to 
                                                                                                                          









































9prevent from the use or abuse of a separate corporate entity to carry out a scheme 
for evasions of statutes and legal duties. 
It is accurate to treat the network-firm as a single entity and not as a set of 
entities because with tort victims it is the reputation of the network-firm which is 
weakened. It is not important for consumers to know the identity of the firms that 
compose the network. When a product does not work right, consumer does not 
search who is in tort or who has produced the faulty component or system. The 
whole is affected but the network itself is not sued. It is the hub-firm that is sued
and  not  other  network  members,  although  the  hub-firm  can sue  its  ‘flawed’
partner.  But  the  reputation  and so  the  cohesion  of  the  collective  entity  are 
sensibly  damaged.  Reputation  effects  are crucial  in  contexts  of  strategically 
interdependent  actors  (Raub  and  Weesie,  1990).  Vertically,  the  hub-firm’s 
reputation could affect the legitimacy of its partners and vice versa because the 
legitimacy  of  the  collective  entity  is  not  independent  of  the  legitimacy  of 
cognitively  related  entities (Kostova  and  Zaheer,  1999).  This  damage  in 
reputation  can  be  deemed as  a  collective  sanction that  foreshadows  de  facto
responsibilities. With these new forms of action attribution, new risks emerge 
and, according to Teubner (1993), the specific character of the network suggests a 
joint politico-legal  liability.  But  this  liability  should  be  reindividualized  in 
function of the degree of decentralization of the network in aid of ‘a threefold 
responsibility  of  collective,  centre,  and  individual  unit’ (ibid.:60). Finally, 
Teubner shows that ‘piercing the contractual veil’ like the network-firm makes 
should result in the institutionalization of a selectively combined liability of the 
network.
If the case of multinational business groups is attractive for understanding 
why the firm is a real entity (see Douglas and Shanks, 1926), the case of the 
network-firm is  more suitable because it  allows to  exclude the role of equity 
ownership in the economic integration of the whole. An important issue should 
lastly be raised: does equity ownership generate more cohesiveness than a less 
formal integration?
6. CONCLUSION
Law  provides  for  a  set  of  legal  entities  that  are  simply  ‘standard-form 
contracts  among  the  parties  who  participate  in  an  enterprise’ (Hansmann  and 
Kraakman, 2000:387). Economic considerations dominate corporate law and are
responsible  for  introducing  the  contractual  paradigm  and  the  property  rights 
paradigm for the firm (Iacobucci and Triantis, 2007). Yet the firm is more than a 
nexus  of contracts  or  group of  assets.  Because  they  are weighty  reductionist, 
contractual  economic  theories take  ‘aggregate  rather  than  an  entity, 
approach−separate relationships comprised the corporation’s ontological center 








































9such reductionist positions, each firm − including the network-firm − is a real 
emergent entity and not an aggregation of individuals or of distinct legal entities. 
Market,  hierarchy, network  and  other  organizational  forms each  represent 
separate social entities which differ from each other not in degree but in their 
ontological nature.
Without recourse to equity ownership, the network-firm succeeds in making 
some legally independent firms a single active unit. Beyond such important legal 
bases  as  employment  contract  and  legal liability,  the  network-firm  exists 
intrinsically and is perpetuated by some integrating forces (glues) strengthened by
the exploitation of powers. These interorganizational powers explain the network-
firm’s  ability  to  cope  with  changing  environment. If  it  seems  clear  that  new 
protective rules provided by law would be relevant in some cases, the question of 
the legal recognition of the network-firm as a single emergent entity is an endless 
debate.  Does  the network-firm  benefit  from  and  emerge owing  to  a  legal 
incompleteness (see Baudry and Gindis, 2005)? What is sure is that the legal 
recognition is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the emergence of 
the network-firm and to theorize it as a single real entity. 
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